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Background: Medical errors are inherently of concern in modern health care. Although surgical errors as incorrect
surgery (e.g., wrong patient, wrong site, or wrong procedure) are infrequent, they are devastating events to
experience. To gain insight about incidents that could lead to incorrect surgery, we surveyed how surgical team
members perceive near misses and their attitudes towards the use of Time Out protocols in the operating room.
We hypothesised that perceptions of near-miss experiences and attitudes towards Time Out protocols vary widely
among surgical team members.
Methods: This cross-sectional study (N = 427) included surgeons, anaesthetists, nurse anaesthetists, and operating
room nurses. The questionnaire consisted of 14 items, 11 of which had dichotomous responses (0 = no; 1 = yes)
and 3 of which had responses on an ordinal scale (never = 0; sometimes = 1; often = 2; always = 3). Items reflected
team members’ experience of near misses or mistakes; their strategies for verifying the correct patient, site, and
procedure; questions about whether they believed that these mistakes could be avoided using the Time Out
protocol; and how they would accept the implementation of the protocol in the operating room.
Results: In the operating room, 38% of respondents had experienced uncertainty of patient identity, 81% had
experienced uncertainty of the surgical site or side, and 60% had prepared for the wrong procedure. Sixty-three per
cent agreed that verifying the correct patient, site, and procedure should be a team responsibility. Thus, only nurse
anaesthetists routinely performed identity checks prior to surgery (P ≤ 0.001). Of the surgical team members, 91%
supported implementation of a Time Out protocol in their operating rooms.
Conclusion: The majority of our surgical personnel experienced near misses with regard to correct patient identity,
surgical site, or procedure. Routines for ensuring the correct patient, site, and surgical procedure must involve all
surgical team members. We find that the near-miss experiences are a wake-up call for systematic risk reducing
efforts and the use of checklists in surgery.
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Medical errors are inherently of great concern in modern
health care. Approximately 1-in-10 hospital in-patients ex-
perience an adverse event, and nearly two-thirds of these are
associated with a surgical provider [1]. Adverse events in
surgical patients are estimated to be highly preventable in
48% of the cases [2]. Although incorrect surgery—defined as* Correspondence: arvid.haugen@helse-bergen.no
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orwrong patient, wrong site, or wrong procedure—occurs in-
frequently, surgical teams recognise these as devastating
events to experience. A case review of wrong-site crani-
otomies identified five major contributing factors: com-
munication breakdowns, inadequate preoperative checks,
technical factors and imaging misidentifications, and sim-
ple human errors [3]. A near-miss event study of ortho-
paedic procedures and noncompliance to antimicrobial
prophylaxis identified causes as human, organisational,
and material factors [4]. Systematic use of a checklist prior
to incision as a preventive effort was recommended byl Ltd. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
Haugen et al. BMC Surgery 2013, 13:46 Page 2 of 7
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2482/13/4640% of the declarants, along with improved communica-
tion between anaesthetists and surgeons [4]. In a malprac-
tice claim study in the Netherlands, wrong patient, wrong
site, or wrong procedure were identified in 16% (46/294)
of cases and were suggested to be preventable if the staff
had followed the comprehensive Surgical Patient Safety
System (SURPASS) of checklists [5]. Ensuring the correct
patient, correct site, and correct procedure is vital in order
to avoid incorrect surgery. The Joint Commission (JC), an
independent organisation accrediting and certifying health
care organisations in the United States, underlines the
importance of implementing a range of risk reduction
strategies to prevent wrong-site surgery. Amongst these
recommendations is that the surgical team should take a
time-out and use active communication techniques to
verify they are dealing with the correct patient, site,
and procedure [6].
Several studies show reductions in both mortality and
morbidity after introducing surgical checklists [7-10].
Improved communication and shared responsibility
within the health care teams may contribute to the elim-
ination of wrong-site surgery [3,11,12]. As error manage-
ment depends on human skills and reliability of surgical
team members, a systematic approach is required [13].
In a concurrent safety climate study performed at our
hospital (Haukeland University Hospital) prior to the
introduction of surgical checklists, anaesthetic personnel
scored significantly higher than operating room nurses
and surgeons on frequency of near-miss events reported
[14]. In general, the safety climate perceptions were sig-
nificantly underscored when compared with hospital
staff in the U.S., e.g. 31% to 62% on frequency of near-
miss events reported [14]. Report of near-miss percep-
tions is considered to have several advantages as fewer
barriers, limited liability and patterns which could be
captured and used to improve surgical care [15,16]. To
better understand the nature of near misses in surgery, a
deeper understanding of surgical team members’ percep-
tions and attitudes has been warranted.
We investigated surgical team members’ perceptions
of incorrect surgery and how the correct patient, correct
site, and correct procedure were ensured in daily rou-
tines. We hypothesised that perceptions of near-miss ex-
periences and attitudes towards Time Out protocols
vary widely amongst surgical team members.
Methods
We surveyed surgical team members’ perceptions and
attitudes using a cross-sectional design that included
427 surgical team members (surgeons, operating room
nurses, anaesthetists, and nurse anaesthetists). Partici-
pants were identified from employment lists provided by
staff managers. All participants worked in the central
operating unit (COU).Organisational context
The study was conducted at a tertiary university hospital
in western Norway (Haukeland University Hospital).
The COU has 22 operating rooms, conducting 15,000
operations annually. The operations comprised ortho-
paedic; cardiothoracic; neuro; ear, nose, and throat
(ENT); plastic; urologic; gastroenterological; and endo-
crine surgeries. The operating room personnel except
for surgeons are administered by the Department of
Anaesthesia and Intensive Care. Time Out protocols,
safety climate instruments, and root cause analysis were
not conducted either before or when this study was car-
ried out in February 2009. One section of the care unit
was familiar with a pre-anaesthetic induction checklist
[17]. An electronic adverse event reporting system was
used throughout the hospital. In a concurrent mapping
of organisational (neurosurgery and orthopaedic) stan-
dards, we found that patient identity was routinely
checked at the ward, and further name tags were
scanned when patients entered the COU. However, if
there was uncertainty about patient identity or body site
markings, patients were not routinely returned to the
ward (Personal communication by SM, ASH and ES).
Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of 14 items, 11 of which
had dichotomous responses (0 = no; 1 = yes) and 3 of
which had responses scored on an ordinal scale (items
7–9) (never = 0; sometimes = 1; often = 2; always = 3).
Items reflected team members’ own experience of near
misses or mistakes; their strategies for ensuring the cor-
rect patient, side, and procedure; questions about
whether they believed that such mistakes could have
been avoided by using the Time Out protocol; and how
they might accept the introduction of the protocol into
the COU. The survey also contained an open-ended
question that allowed respondents to offer their opinions
on the topic. The 14 items are listed in Table 1. The sur-
vey also included questions about participant character-
istics such as profession, experience, and gender.
The survey was pilot tested by 10 research fellows and
medical staff who reviewed the functionality of the elec-
tronic system and the adequacy and relevance of the ques-
tions. The expert panel regarded the validity of the
questionnaire as appropriate in terms of its design and
content. The initial review resulted in minor adjustments
of sample characteristics; i.e., changing the self-report of
professional experiences into years practising instead of
categorising professional experiences into different groups.
Data collection
The survey was distributed to all eligible medical
personnel through our hospital email system. We used a
web-based questionnaire with an information letter and
Table 1 Time Out survey at Haukeland University
Hospital, Bergen, Norway, 2009
1 Have you observed a wrong patient being brought into the
operating room?
2 Have you experienced uncertainty about patient identity in the
operating room?
3 Have you observed wrong positioning of patient prior to surgery?
4 Have you experienced uncertainty about operation side prior
surgery?
5 Have you observed preparation for wrong procedure?
6 Is the responsibility for checking patient identity, operation side,
and operation procedure a joint responsibility?
7 Do you check patient identity prior to each operation?
8 Do you verify the correct site/side prior to each operation?
9 Do you verify the correct surgical procedure prior each operation?
10 Do you believe incorrect surgery is performed as a result of not
verifying patient identity, side, and procedure?
11 Does anyone use the Time Out protocol in your operating room?
12 Do you believe the Time Out protocol can prevent incorrect
surgery? a
13 Do you find the Time Out protocol useful?
14 Would you like to use a Time Out protocol in your operating room?
aIncorrect surgery: wrong patient, wrong side/site, or wrong procedure.
Information given to respondents prior to item 11: Time Out protocol is
performed prior to skin incision. The team verifies correct patient identity,
correct site, and correct procedure. The operation does not start until all
agree. One dedicated person in the team coordinates the checklist. Time Out
is documented in patient records.
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naire had to be submitted within four weeks. To in-
crease the interest of potential respondents prior to
distribution, we also promoted the survey on the hos-
pital intranet page and on wall posters in the COU. The
hospital managers provided access for survey recruit-
ment at staff meetings.
Statistics
Descriptive statistics were used to quantify the respon-
dents’ characteristics. Analysis of differences within pro-
fessions and between professions, as well as the safety
items, was performed with the Pearson’s chi-squared
test. P-values were two-sided, and the significance level
was 0.05. All data were analysed using SPSS version 18
[18]. Qualitative content analysis was used to evaluate
surgical team members’ experiences of incorrect surgery
and to assess patient safety issues reported in the open-
ended question [19].
Ethics
The study was reviewed and approved by the Committee
for Medical Research Ethics of the Western Norwegian
Regional Health Authorities and the Norwegian Social Sci-
ences Data Services. Permission to perform the study was
also granted and endorsed by the hospital management.Respondents agreed to participate by answering the ques-
tionnaire. The Department of Research and Development
preserved electronic data anonymity and assisted in ad-
ministering the survey. Data were secured in the hospital
research server; the study complied with the Helsinki
Declaration [20].
Results
Answers were received from 64% (275/427) of staff,
including 54% (91/169) of the surgeons, 59% (50/85) of
the anaesthetists, 69% (68/98) of the operating room
nurses, and 88% (66/75) of the nurse anaesthetists
(Figure 1). The numbers of responses from males and
females were equal. There was a significant difference
(P = 0.032) across genders on responses to the question
about uncertainty of the correct procedure: Males were
less uncertain. Agreement that the responsibility for
checking patient identity, site, and procedure was a joint
team task was more evident in females (P = 0.003). The
mean (SD) years of experience was 19 (13.8) years.
Figure 2 presents the characteristics of the respondents.
Thirty-eight per cent (105/275) of the participants ob-
served instances of failure to confirm patient identity,
and 19% (51/275) observed the wrong patient brought
into the operating room. In addition, 43% (119/275) ob-
served that patients were positioned on the wrong side
before incision. A total of 81% (222/275) experienced in-
stances in which the anatomical side or surgical site of
patients was not confirmed, while 60% (164/275) experi-
enced occasions in which the staff mistakenly prepared
for a procedure different from the procedure actually
planned. There was significant variability (P ≤ 0.001)
amongst practitioners of different health care professions
with regard to experiencing safety issues before surgery
(Table 2). Figure 3 shows how members of different
health care professions differed in performing patient
identity checks prior to surgery. When asked whether
the three original Universal Time Out protocol check-
points (verifying correct patient, site, and procedure)
Figure 2 Sample characteristics of work experience at
Haukeland University Hospital, Bergen, Norway, 2009.
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agreed, 16% (45/275) disagreed, and 20% (54/275) were
uncertain about the responsibility. As many as 90%
(247/275) of the participants believed that failure to ver-
ify the site or procedure prior to surgery is an important
factor in causing surgical incidents. Only 5% (14/275)
were familiar with the Universal Time Out Protocol.
The majority of participants, in all 96% (263/275), be-
lieved that a Time Out protocol could aid in preventing
wrong surgery, and 91% (250/275) agreed that a Time
Out protocol should be implemented in our operating
rooms.
Forty-four participants answered the open-ended
question and included their reflections on attitudes and
perceptions of the Time Out protocol and safety issues.
Of these comments, 14 were in favour of the Time Out
protocol: For example, ‘… this is a good idea. Hopefully
it could be implemented at our COU; so go for it!’ ‘Good,
I have been missing Time Outs for a long time’.
The themes emerging from the content analysis were
safety issues that involve ensuring patient identity and
communication failures. A frequent problem was that
the electronic surgical operating plan system was in-
accurate, at times, regarding the planned procedure orTable 2 Surgical team members’ experiences with near misse
Surgical team me
Experiences with: Anaesthetist NA
(n = 50) (n = 66)
Yes No Yes No
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%)
Wrong patient in OR 14 (28) 36 (72) 13 (20) 53 (80)
Uncertain of patient identity 31 (62) 19 (38) 30 (46) 36 (54)
Prepared for another procedure 26 (52) 24 (48) 42 (64) 24 (36)
Uncertain of correct site 46 (92) 4 (8) 58 (88) 8 (12)
Wrong positioning of patient 21 (42) 29 (58) 31 (47) 35 (53)
Abbreviations: NA Nurse anaesthetist, OR Operating room.
aP-value based on Pearson’s chi-squared test.
Surgical team members’ experiences with near misses in the operating room (wron
wrong procedure and positioning) at Haukeland University Hospital, Norway, 2009.site and the surgical or anaesthetic equipment required.
Possible reasons for the inaccuracies were limitations in
the electronic computer program or incomplete notes of
variables on the request form. Another safety concern
was that surgeons were unaware of patient identity and
site of procedure when they arrived in the operating
room. One respondent stated: ‘I have been here for
15 years now and have experienced one or two actual
wrong site surgeries in all’.
Discussion
Overall the results show a lack of organisational safety
culture development. Only 63% of the respondents
stated that verifying the correct patient, site, and proced-
ure is a joint team responsibility. Routines for ensuring
the correct patient, correct site, and correct surgical pro-
cedure were practised significant differently (P < 0.001)
amongst our medical professionals (Table 2). Figure 3
presents the differences between these professionals in
ensuring patient identity prior to every surgery. Nurse
anaesthetists are the gatekeepers of correct patient iden-
tity in our COU, and thus are more responsible than
other team members for verifying patient identity during
transfer to the operating room. Hence, the other surgical
team members seemed to rely on the locally established
system about whether to accept or eventually reveal in-
correct patient situations in the operating room. We re-
gard this as an unsatisfactory safety assurance system. In
our view, all involved medical personnel must check pa-
tient identity with regard to their own medical objec-
tives. To address team responsibility for verifying the
correct patient and identity we strongly recommend
routinely use of a surgical safety checklist [7,10].
In the present study, survey comments of surgical
team members underline that various flaws in the oper-
ation planning system or incorrect information ahead of
surgery contributed to the extensive experience ofs in the operating room
mbers’ profession
Surgeon OR Nurse Total
(n = 91) (n = 68) (N = 275)
Yes No Yes No Yes No P-
n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) valuea
11 (12) 80 (88) 13 (19) 55 (81) 51 (19) 224 (81) 0.136
21 (23) 70 (77) 23 (34) 45 (66) 105 (38) 160 (62) <0.001
49 (54) 42 (46) 47 (69) 21 (31) 154 (60) 111 (40) <0.001
53 (58) 38 (42) 65 (96) 3 (4) 222 (81) 53 (19) <0.001
32 (35) 59 (65) 35 (52) 33 (48) 119 (43) 156 (57) 0.197
g patient, uncertainty about correct patient and correct site, preparing for
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current safety climate study in our hospital that found
surgical patient information handover between depart-
ments or units to be poor [14]. Other studies underline
the importance of communication [3,11,12]. Safety atti-
tudes in an organisation should be monitored through
safety climate questionnaires and interviews of staff as part
of a systematic program aiming to improve safety.
Wrong patient
Thirty-eight per cent of the participants experienced
instances of unconfirmed patient identity in the operating
room, and 19% experienced wrong patients being brought
into the operating room. The number of surgical team
members experiencing incorrect surgeries (i.e., wrong pa-
tient brought into the operating room, surgery performed
on the wrong site, or the wrong procedure planned) seems
high. According to our results, these experiences are
expected to occur at least once during one’s professional
career. In a study of wrong-site surgeries reported to the
Pennsylvania Patient Safety Reporting System, Clarke et al.
found that of 433,528 reports, 427 notifications were
about wrong-site surgery. Of these, 70% were wrong side,
56% were near misses, 14% were wrong location/level, 9%
were wrong procedure, and 8% were actually performed
on the wrong patient [21].
Wrong site
Experiences of surgery planned for the wrong site/side
(81%) and wrong positioning of the patient on the operat-
ing table (43%) revealed that near misses were familiar to
most of the surgical team members in our study. Incidents
of near misses are prone to occur up to 300 times more
often than actual events [15]. A literature review under-
lines the advantages of reporting near misses as they are
more frequent than adverse events and with fewer barriersto reporting [16]. A study of wrong-site surgery reported
that 16% (173/1050) of the surgeons were about to operate
on the wrong site but were warned prior to incision, and
21% (217/1050) reported that they had performed wrong-
site surgery at least once [22].
Our study did not examine the actual incidence of in-
correct surgeries. However, from our results we could
infer that wrong site/side near misses would probably
mitigate by systematic site marking prior to surgery.
Marking the site or side before surgery is one of the rec-
ommendations of the JC to prevent incorrect surgery
[6]. This includes preoperative routines for when site
marking should be performed, how the site should be
marked, and by whom. Marking the wrong site or pa-
tient may occur in scenarios in which surgeons rush to
the operating room to mark sites that failed to be
marked in the preoperative ward. Multiple surgeons
performing several procedures on the same patient and
unusual time pressures are amongst the factors contrib-
uting to wrong-site surgery [11].
The near misses identified in the present study highlight
the need for implementing systematic safety efforts in sur-
gical care. Using checklists that cover the entire surgical
pathway, from admission to discharge, as described in the
SURPASS comprehensive checklist system, can further
improve surgical care and prevent incorrect surgery [5].
Wrong procedure
Of the surgical team respondents, 60% experienced plan-
ning the wrong procedure. The answers to the open-
ended question of our survey revealed various reasons. A
common reason was insufficient communication between
the surgeons and the operating room nurses or anaesthetic
staff due to lack of information in the electronic planning
system or lack of information from the surgeon.
According to previous reports, performing a wrong
procedure is not the most frequent adverse event [21].
However, our study suggests that preoperative planning
and communication in our hospital can be improved. The
National Patient Safety Agency reported that imple-
menting the WHO safety surgical checklist could reduce
incorrect surgeries [12,23]. Panesar et al. found that check-
lists could potentially mitigate 14.9% of near misses and
83.3% of harmful events [12,23]. In another study of surgi-
cal checklists, the procedure check during the Time Out
was rated as ‘very important’ by nurses and ‘important to
some degree’ by surgeons, indicating that different profes-
sionals perceive checklists differently [24].
Attitudes towards protocols
Incorrect surgery occurs in the context of an organisation,
teams, and culture. As 91% of the surgical team members
in the present study had a positive attitude towards time-
outs, the majority of professionals and groups welcomed a
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prone to be influenced by the awareness evoked in the
near-miss survey and by its results. Hence, these positive
attitudes towards protocols seem to have paved the way for
the subsequent, successful implementation of the WHO’s
Surgical Safety Checklist in our hospital. Indeed, compli-
ance to the three parts of the checklist was 77% to 85%
[25]. Moreover, in the checklist-intervention group, there
was a reduction in frequency of near misses reported,
suggesting that the checklist had mitigated, to some degree,
the problem of operating room mistakes [25].
An important finding of the present study is that raised
awareness amongst the clinical staff about near misses in
daily routines and safety barriers might have positive influ-
ence prior to checklist implementation. High checklist
compliance may be challenging to maintain over time. In
our hospital, adjusted team involvement was observed in a
qualitative study of nurses’ experiences with the use of the
Surgical Safety Checklist after one year [26]. Three strat-
egies were identified amongst operating room nurses and
nurse anaesthetists—distancing, moderating, and engaging;
all influenced checklist performance and compliance [26].
Eliminating medical errors
The high trust patients have in hospital staff mandates
that we strive to achieve a zero-level of preventable in-
correct surgery. Modern surgical activity could be com-
pared to high reliability organisations (HROs). HROs are
complex: They perform tasks under time pressures, with
demanding activities and low incident rates or with
complete absence of catastrophic failures over time [13].
However in hospitals, adverse events occur in nearly
1-in-10 in-hospital patients [1]. In HROs the system
approach is primed at all levels of the organisation, with
a preoccupation of the possibility of failure and with
continual training on familiar scenarios [13].
A systematic review and a study of extended Surgical
Time Out do not support the effectiveness of the current
JC Universal Protocol in decreasing the incidence of
wrong-site or wrong-level surgery [11,27]. Hence, incor-
rect surgery may be prevented by surface body marking of
the targeted anatomical structure and by displaying these
images on monitors in the operating room [11]. Addition-
ally, intraoperative imaging by fluoroscopy and ultrasound
may also confirm the diagnosis and severity in a variety of
clinical situations. In cardiac surgery, trans-oesophageal
echocardiography is frequently used to define the current
clinical problem and may be of crucial importance in de-
ciding the final surgical strategy.
Recently, Beuzekom and colleagues performed a con-
trolled pre-post intervention study to minimise latent
safety risk factors in the operating room and found lower
perceived and reported incident rates in the intervention
group [28]. In the study of Pronovost et al., eliminatingmedical errors and maintaining a low incident rate after
implementing a checklist and infection control procedures
to prevent bloodstream infections related to catheter
insertions indicate acceptance of an improved standard
of care [29]. Building clinical safety defences and barriers
(i.e., intraoperative imaging, ultrasound and checklists) in
operating rooms applies to a systematic approach for
enhancing and supporting surgical team members in
minimising near misses and errors [13,25].
Systematic risk reducing efforts
To prevent near misses and incorrect surgery we suggest
implementing:
 Hospital safety improvement programs
 Monitor and develop safety culture
 Chairs must report on an support safety efforts
 Build in clinical safety defences and barriers
 Surgical team training
 Perioperative checklists
Limitations
The reports in the survey of surgical team members’
experiences of incorrect surgery are probably referring
to the same occasions and cases. This could be regarded
as a limitation; however, the aim of this study was not to
count the numbers of actual incorrect surgeries. Since
non-responder analysis was not performed, we have little
information about personnel who failed to respond to
our survey. Nonetheless, the response rate of 64% is
quite satisfactory for an email-based survey. The ques-
tionnaire depended on surgical team members’ memory
of incorrect surgery experiences at this hospital. This
could have biased the accuracy of the responses. Fur-
thermore, an observation of intraoperative routines
could have added more in-depth understanding of near-
miss experiences in the operating rooms.
Conclusion
The majority of our surgical personnel experienced near
misses and failures with regard to patient identity, surgi-
cal site, and/or procedure. Routines for ensuring correct
patient, correct site, and correct surgical procedure were
practised significantly differently by medical profes-
sionals, supporting our hypothesis. Identity check must
involve all surgical team members with regard to their
own medical objectives and also as a joint team respon-
sibility. As raised awareness about near misses and
inconsistent safety systems in the operating room en-
hances positive attitudes towards protocols, implementa-
tion of a Time Out protocol was welcomed.
We find that the study results of near-miss experiences
with failure to confirm the patient identity, wrong patient
being brought into the operating room, positioning of the
Haugen et al. BMC Surgery 2013, 13:46 Page 7 of 7
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dures are a wake-up call for systematic risk reducing efforts
and the use of checklists in surgery.
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